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I. INTRODUCTION
John Stuart Mill offers arguably the most insightful and important
defense of free speech. He contends that freedom of speech will
contribute to “the permanent interest of man as a progressive being.”1
Freedom of speech is often justified based on the idea that an
undisturbed marketplace of ideas is an essential ingredient to a healthy
democracy.2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has declared this the primary
purpose of the First Amendment: “to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.”3 This is a
strong defense, but it does not go far enough. Mill does us a great
service when he reminds us that we are fallible beings. 4 He reasons
that although we may be confident a view is incorrect, it alone is no
basis to silence that view. 5 He reasoned that any silenced opinion
could be true, and to deny this is to assume one’s infallibility. 6 In
addition, Mill provides that although a silenced opinion could be
incorrect, it “may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of the
truth . . . .”7
Much ink has been spilled over the importance of freedom of
speech, but Mill’s positions are particularly insightful additions. And
there are many more reasons to defend freedom of speech—one of
1. Michael Lacewing, Mill on Freedom of Thought and Expression, ROUTLEDGE:
TAYLOR
&
FRANCIS
GROUP
1,
1
http://documents.routledgeinteractive.s3.amazonaws.com/9781138793934/A2/Mill/MillTruth.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LUD-4WW4].
2. Brian Miller, There's No Need to Compel Speech. The Marketplace of Ideas Is
Working,
FORBES
(Dec.
4,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/briankmiller/2017/12/04/theres-no-need-to-compelspeech-the-marketplace-of-ideas-is-working/#674806914e68
[https://perma.cc/VXP4-ZXEY]. For a highly critical discussion of the analogy of
the marketplace of ideas, see Paul H. Brietzke, How and Why the Marketplace of
Ideas Fails, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 951 (1997).
3. Jacquelyn E. Fradette, Online Terms of Service: A Shield for First Amendment
Scrutiny of Government Action, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 948 (2013) (quoting
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
4. Lacewing, supra note 1, at 1.
5. Id.
6. Id. (quoting Mill: “the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is
that it is robbing the human race . . . If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great
a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its
collision with error”).
7. Id. at 2.
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which is that viewpoint diversity helps us get a clearer view of the
truth. 8 Regardless of the many reasons why free speech should be
protected, important changes to the way we exchange ideas, driven by
the invention and proliferation of social media, are challenging the
law’s ability to safeguard free speech and the marketplace of ideas.
The way in which we exercise the right to free speech and engage
with others in the marketplace of ideas has fundamentally changed.9
Freely expressing one’s views on important social and political
matters evokes the traditional image of “a person standing on a soap
box in the town square speaking her mind into a megaphone with
Congress restrained by the text of the First Amendment and unable to
interfere.” 10 Now, with an internet connection and a social media
account, “any person . . . can become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.” 11 Some have
compared the significance of this transformation to the magnificent
changes that came with the introduction of the printing press in
Europe.12
The First Amendment is based on the premise that the government
is the primary threat to free speech and, absent government
censorship, the marketplace of ideas exists in a healthy and
undisturbed state.13 But that premise may no longer be reliable in light
of the increasing popularity of private social media companies. 14
Today, people increasingly use social media platforms like Facebook,

8 . See Nathan Honeycutt, Political Intolerance Among University Faculty
Highlights Need for Viewpoint Diversity,
FORBES (Nov. 21, 2016 12:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin
/2016/11/21/ political-intolerance-among-university-faculty-highlights-need-forviewpoint-diversity/#771f348514b5 [https://perma.cc/96NR-URD3].
9. See generally Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Social Media Use in 2018,
PEW RESEARCH CTR.: INTERNET & TECHN. (Mar. 1, 2018),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-media-use-in-2018/
[https://perma.cc/92JU-XEXP].
10. Fradette, supra note 3, at 948.
11. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
12. Jordan Peterson, YouTube is the Modern Day Gutenberg Press, YOUTUBE
(Dec
7,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nALQe3L9Os
[https://perma.cc/4CMF-ZALC].
13. Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST.
COLUM. U. (Sept. 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-firstamendment-obsolete [https://perma.cc/4S9R-XWQ7].
14. See id.
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YouTube, and Twitter to discuss social and political matters.15 Nearly
two-thirds of American adults (65%) use these sites, an increase of
fifty-eight percent since 2005.16 Ninety percent of young adults age
eighteen to twenty-nine use social media, and this is up from twelve
percent in 2005.17 The clear trend is that speech is increasingly taking
place on private social media platforms that have wide latitude to
censor content under the contractual relationship they establish with
their users.18
The movement of speech onto private platforms is concerning;
some scholars wonder if this trend is making the First Amendment
obsolete. 19 The reason why is because the First Amendment only
protects against speech restrictions imposed by state actors;
infringements on one’s speech by private actors are generally not
protected by the constitution.20 Because social media companies are
private actors, any censorship suits against those companies would not
survive the threshold requirement of state action.21 Thus, any dispute
would be resolved by contract which could either limit (or extend)
additional First Amendment protections to users.22
This article will attempt to meaningfully advance the scholarship
addressing the relationship between social media companies, the state
action doctrine, and the First Amendment. It will argue that, despite
numerous allegations of censorship and calls for judicial intervention,
it is unlikely that federal courts will consider social media companies
state actors despite their increasing influence and importance. But it
will also argue that it is increasingly likely that a court could conclude
that a social media company is a state actor in light of recent trends

15. Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, The Political Environment on Social Media,
PEW RESEARCH CTR.: INTERNET & TECH.
(Oct.
25,
2016),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/25/the-political-environment-on-socialmedia/ [https://perma.cc/RF2T-VQX7].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Wu, supra note 13 (“[T]he main point of this paper . . . is to demonstrate that
a range of speech control techniques [have] arisen from which the First Amendment,
at present, provides little or no protection.”).
20. Julie K. Brown, Less Is More: Decluttering the State Action Doctrine, 73 MO.
L. REV. 561, 561 (2008).
21. See id.
22. See Fradette, supra note 3, at 948.
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and desires to impose regulations on these companies. 23 Further, it
will argue that if courts continue to conclude that social media
companies are not state actors, it may be time to once again rethink
our state action jurisprudence and whether we should tolerate
infringements on speech just because they are committed by private
actors.24
Further, anticipating the possibility that a court could conclude
that a social media company is a state actor, this article will explore
the appropriate First Amendment scrutiny that ought to be applied to
censorship on social media platforms, arguing that intermediate
scrutiny is most appropriate. It will conclude by echoing recent
scholarship which suggests that the First Amendment may becoming
increasingly obsolete in light of the movement of speech into private
realms outside the scope of constitutional protection25, and why this
should both give us pause and force us to contemplate solutions.
Part I will explore in more detail the changing landscape of
political and social discussion, how social media companies regulate
speech, and increasing allegations of censorship on social media
platforms. Part II will discuss the state action doctrine26, its purpose,
history, and exceptions. Part III will introduce the First Amendment,
the different levels of scrutiny courts apply in First Amendment cases,
and why intermediate scrutiny is the most appropriate tier to apply to
alleged censorship on social media platforms.
II. SOCIAL MEDIAL PLATFORMS AND CENSORSHIP CONCERNS
A. The Changing Landscape of Political and Social Discussion
It goes without saying that the way people talk about politics and
current events has radically changed. People today are increasingly
engaging in political speech online.27 Social network sites now enjoy
traffic of hundreds of millions of viewers; around 800 million users

23. Benjamin F. Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in the Age of
Facebook, 44 N.M. L. REV. 121, 127 (2014).
24. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 507
(1985).
25. See Wu, supra note 13.
26. I would like to thank Benjamin F. Jackson for his article’s contribution and
generation of the idea for this article.
27. See Duggan & Smith, supra note 15.
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visit Facebook28 daily.29 In a given week, millennials generally look
to social media platforms for their sources of political news.30 About
half of Generation X reported receiving news on Facebook in a given
week. 31 During the 2016 presidential election, about one-third of
eighteen to twenty-nine-year-old Americans listed social media as the
most helpful source for informing them about the election.32
Political candidates have also taken advantage of the low cost of
advertising to promote their policies and candidacies on social media
sites like YouTube. 33 Since April 2015, voters have watched more
than 110 million hours of such content on YouTube.34 After popular
current events occur, the time Americans spend watching videos
online related to these events greatly increases, and candidates attempt
to provide video content to educate voters about their positions on the
topics.35
Content creators on YouTube hold tremendous sway over the
opinions of the users who frequent their channels.36 More than half of
YouTube users between the ages of eighteen and forty-nine comment
that their political opinions are influenced by YouTube creators. 37
Politicians have associated their political campaigns with these

28. See Ellen P. Goodman & Julia Powles, Facebook and Google: Most Powerful
and Secretive Empires We've Ever Known, THE GUARDIAN, (Sept. 28, 2016 3:00
EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/28/google-facebookpowerful-secretive-empire-transparency [https://perma.cc/69VF-MKFC].
29. See Duggan & Smith, supra note 15.
30 . Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, & Katerina Eva Matsa, Millenials and
Political News, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: JOURNALISM & MEDIA (June 1, 2015),
http://www.journalism.org/2015/06/01/millennials-political-news/
[https://perma.cc/45WR-BM4U].
31. Id.
32. Jeffrey Gottfried, Michael Barthel, Elisa Shearer & Amy Mitchell, The 2016
Presidential Campaign-a News Event That’s Hard to Miss, PEW RESEARCH CTR.:
JOURNALISM & MEDIA (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/2016/02/04/the2016-presidential-campaign-a-news-event-thats-hard-to-miss/
[https://perma.cc/V35U-4AMH].
33. Kate Stanford, How Political Ads and Video Content Influence Voter Opinion,
THINK WITH GOOGLE (Mar. 2016), https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/marketingresources/content-marketing/political-ads-video-content-influence-voter-opinion/
[https://perma.cc/88ET-R7J3].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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content creators to try to gain influence over their followers. 38
YouTube also serves as a key forum for political dialogue and debate
of important issues because social media platforms provide a low cost
and easy means for people to express their opinions.39
Multiple United States Supreme Court justices have also
recognized the importance of this emerging trend of speech taking
place on social networking websites. 40 During oral argument in
Packingham v. North Carolina, Justice Anthony Kennedy, speaking
of Twitter and Facebook, noted that “[t]heir utility and the extent of
their coverage are greater than the communication you could have
ever had, even in the paradigm of public square.” 41 Justice Kagan
agreed, responding that: “[t]the president now uses Twitter . . .
everybody uses Twitter. . . [a]ll 50 governors, all 100 senators, every
member of the House has a Twitter account. So this has become a . . .
crucially important channel of political communication.” 42 Justice
Ginsburg said that it is dangerous to restrict access to social media
because “these people are being cut off from a very large part of the
marketplace of ideas. And the First Amendment includes not only the
right to speak, but the right to receive information.”43 Justice Kagan
agreed:
Whether it's political community, whether it's religious community . . .
these sites have become embedded in our culture as ways to
communicate and ways to exercise our constitutional rights. How many
people under 30 do you think don't use these sites to get all their
information? Under 35? I mean, increasingly, this is the way people get
everything, all information.44

Such responses indicate the openness of our highest court to the notion
that speech on these platforms is increasingly important and worthy
of protection.

38. Stanford, supra note 33.
39. Id.
40 . See Mark Grabowski, Opinion: Twitter’s Censorship May Be Unconstitutional, WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Mar. 14, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/twitters-censorship-may-beunconstitutional/article/2617261 [https://perma.cc/E2UW-Y3L3].
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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B. How is Content Regulated by Social Media Companies?
Confronted with so much speech and political content, social
media companies use a variety of mechanisms to regulate their
traffic. 45 On YouTube 46 , one way that content can be restricted or
limited is through its “Restricted Mode” feature.47 This feature is an
optional setting that is, according to YouTube, used by “a small subset
of users, such as libraries, schools, and public institutions, who choose
to have a more limited viewing experience on YouTube.” 48 The
default Restricted Mode setting is off. 49 But if a user turns it on,
YouTube uses a rating system that categorizes videos based on their
content.50 YouTube first uses an algorithm that automatically assesses
every video based on varying “signals,” including the title, metadata,
and language in the video so YouTube can comb through a massive
amount of content and assign ratings to that content. 51 Human
reviewers sometimes review videos and assign ratings under different
criteria, including “context, tone, and focus” to determine how to rate
the content.52 YouTube concedes that with the amount of content the
algorithm reviews, the system is imperfect.53 An additional trigger for
human review occurs when a user “flags” a video as “potentially
inappropriate” 54 Further, if a user believes their video has been
improperly categorized and made unavailable in restricted mode, they
may appeal which also triggers manual review.55

45. See generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Delete Squad: Google, Twitter, Facebook
and the new global battle over the future of free speech, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 28,
2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/113045/free-speech-internet-silicon-valleymaking-rules [https://perma.cc/NCV3-2NYA].
46. Although there are numerous social media platforms, this section will focus
on the practices of YouTube and Facebook.
47. Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at *4,
Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) No. 17-CV-06064-LHK,
2018 WL 105688.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at *5.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Facebook regulates content through a complicated system with
multiple levels of protection.56 Facebook provides staffers in a variety
of locations around the world with a rulebook that gives guidance to
assist with interpretation of Facebook’s community standards to make
initial censorship decisions. 57 Content reviewers are estimated to
review several thousand posts a day per person.58 While many of the
decisions to censor content are straightforward59, a significant amount
of the decisions involve discretion.60 In harder cases, much like the
law, the community guidelines don’t offer much guidance as to how
the speech or content should be treated. 61 Next, if certain content
continues to receive more complaints, regional managers act as a midlevel appellate court, and if the controversy surrounding the content
continues to grow, top U.S. executives can step in to make the
decision. 62 Interestingly, Facebook employees have expressed
concern for how Facebook handles controversial content, but they
declined to be named for fear of job repercussions.63 Undoubtedly, the
practice of regulating content on these platforms is daunting. While
certainly not exhaustive, the above mechanisms are illustrative of the
processes in place to regulate content on social medial platforms.
C. Allegations of Censorship and Political Bias on Social Media
Platforms
On the whole, social media companies have expressed their
commitment to the open exchange of diverse points of view.64 But,
56. See Kristina Cooke, Dan Levine, Dustin Volz, Facebook Executives Feel the
Heat of Content Controversies, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2016, 12:05 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-content-insight/facebook-executivesfeel-the-heat-of-content-controversies-idUSKCN12S0D3 [https://perma.cc/6PLKFBXG].
57. Id.
58. Aarti Shahani, From Hate Speech to Fake News: The Content Crisis Facing
Mark
Zuckerberg,
NPR
(Nov.
17,
2016,
5:02
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/11/17/495827410/from-hatespeech-to-fake-news-the-content-crisis-facing-mark-zuckerberg
[https://perma.cc/6NSL-78R6].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Shahani, supra note 58.
64. See Jackson, supra note 23, at 127.
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they also have competing interests which create pressure to censor
content. 65 In the wake of WikiLeaks’ release of classified United
States information, the Department of Justice was able to force
Twitter to provide information about WikiLeaks accounts.66 Senator
Joe Lieberman attempted to persuade Twitter to block pro-Taliban
accounts and speech. 67 Further, YouTube was faced with pressure
from several politicians in the United States and abroad to block many
videos that promoted terrorism.68 Social media companies also face
pressures to prevent criminals from targeting victims, accusers, or
witnesses, or to prevent harassment and intimidation.69 There are also
strong economic pressures related to preserving relationships with
advertisers who place their ads on users’ videos. 70 While scholars
have addressed these internal and external pressures that encourage
censorship, less attention has been paid to the possibility that
censorship may be caused by the political bias of those who regulate
content on the platforms themselves. 71 This contention has gained
considerable traction in the preceding months, particularly among
those on the political right.72 These allegations were brought into the
national spotlight in Mark Zuckerberg’s recent testimony when
Senator Ted Cruz questioned Mr. Zuckerberg about political bias on
his platform.73
While both conservative and liberal speech has been subject to
censorship on both Facebook and YouTube, outrage surrounding this
censorship has been most pronounced on the right.74 Most salient is a

65. Id.
66. Id. at 128–29.
67. Id. at 129.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 129–30.
70. Daisuke Wakabayashi & Sapna Maheshwari, YouTube Advertiser Exodus
Highlights Perils of Online Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/23/business/media/youtube-advertisersoffensive-content.html [https://perma.cc/4ZKB-KBSC].
71. See Jackson, supra note 23, at 131 (briefly addressing politically motivated
reasons for censorship on social media platforms).
72. Blair Guild, Sen. Ted Cruz Grills Mark Zuckerberg about Facebook Political
Bias, CBS NEWS (Apr. 10, 2018, 7:12 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sented-cruz-grills-mark-zuckerberg-facebook-political-bias/ [https://perma.cc/R8KJ9YZQ].
73. Id.
74. See id.
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recent dispute between YouTube and Prager University. 75 Prager
University was created by the prominent conservative figure Dennis
Prager devoted to, among other things, “promote what is true, what is
good, what is excellent, and what is noble through digital media.”76
The site reports that they have received over two billion views on
YouTube and Facebook, combined. 77 Prager University filed a
lawsuit in the Northern District of California alleging that around
three dozen of their YouTube videos were restricted due to the
conservative viewpoints they espoused.78 YouTube again found itself
in the spotlight over decisions to censor certain content when,
following the Parkland shooting, YouTube introduced increased
restrictions on videos that involve firearms. 79 YouTube will now
restrict videos that promote or link to websites that sell guns and other
accessories.80 It will also restrict videos that contain instructions on
how to assemble guns.81 In addition, conspiracy theorist Alex Jones
was recently banned from several social media companies’ platforms,
including YouTube.82
These allegations of censorship and political bias have also been
levied at Twitter. In 2015, the former CEO of Twitter was alleged to
have taken measures to prevent speech critical of President Obama
during a Q&A session from spreading on Twitter.83 It was specifically
75. See infra, section III.B.1 (discussing this litigation in detail).
76. About Us, PRAGERU, https://www.prageru.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/82
PQ-WWJ2].
77. PRAGERU, https://www.prageru.com [https://perma.cc/CF7R-BDBN].
78. Ian Lovett & Jack Nicas, PragerU Sues YouTube in Free-Speech Case, WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
(Oct.
23,
2017,
10:24
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/prageru-sues-youtube-in-free-speech-case1508811856 [https://perma.cc/F3HF-DZMB].
79. Niraj Chokshi, YouTube to Ban Videos Promoting Gun Sales, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/business/youtube-gunban.html [https://perma.cc/XZQ9-8UWZ].
80. Id.
81. Id.
82 . April Glaser, Apple Banned Alex Jones and Infowars, and Spotify and
Facebook Followed Suit, SLATE (Aug 06, 2018, 9:32 AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2018/08/apple-and-spotify-are-now-both-blockinginfowars-and-alex-jones-podcasts.html [https://perma.cc/RXH7-F2M7].
83 .
Rudy Takala, Report: Twitter Censored Messages Critical of Obama,
WASHINGTON
EXAMINER
(Aug.
11,
2016,
1:38
PM),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/report-twitter-censored-messages-criticalof-obama/article/2599141.

110

MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC.

[40

alleged that the former CEO ordered that his employees create an
algorithm that would suppress critical speech and if any such speech
was missed by the algorithm, employees would manually censor it.84
Twitter also came under fire for banning Breitbart News editor Milo
Yiannopoulos, and appearing to remove “DNC leaks” from Twitter’s
“trending news” section while it was gaining popularity among
users.85 More recently the CEO of Twitter came under fire for his post
on Twitter that signaled his agreement with an article that, among
other things, declared that “there is no bipartisan way forward” and
that the United States has two irreconcilable worldviews “that must
be resolved in short order.” 86 Some have argued that this article’s
main contention is that the Republican party needs to be severely
marginalized in order for the United States to move forward and solve
its major problems.87
Conservative groups are not the only groups claiming censorship
on social media platforms. In 2016, a coalition of more than seventy
civil rights groups asked Facebook to provide additional clarification
regarding its polices for censoring content. 88 They alleged that
Facebook consistently removed posts that documented human rights
violations and sometimes the removal was initiated by police
request.89 The groups pointed to several examples: “the deactivation
of Korryn Gaines’ account during a standoff with police, the
suspension of live footage from the Dakota Access pipeline protests,
the removal of historic photographs such as ‘napalm girl’, the
disabling of Palestinian journalists’ accounts and reports of Black
Lives Matter activists’ content being removed.” 90 In addition, the
LGBTQ community expressed concern that YouTube was hiding
content created by members of their community under their Restricted
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Teri Webster, Twitter CEO Sparks Controversy by Praising Article Suggesting Dems Start ‘Civil War’, THE BLAZE (Apr. 8, 2018 12:19 PM),
https://www.theblaze.com/news/2018/04/08/twitter-ceo-sparks-controversy-bypraising-article-suggesting-dems-start-civil-war [https://perma.cc/7HQD-44EF].
87. Id.
88. Olivia Solon, Civil Rights Groups: Facebook Should Protect, Not Censor,
Human Rights Issues, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2016, 3:54 EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/31/facebook-human-rightscensorship-civil-rights-mark-zuckerberg-aclu [https://perma.cc/VU4G-25M3].
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Mode. Users reported that videos containing the words “‘gay,’
‘lesbian,’ and ‘bisexual’” were hidden.91
There are three reasons why any allegations of censorship on
social media should raise serious concerns. First, the power of social
media companies is truly remarkable. Facebook, for example,
exceeded 500 billion in market capitalization in late 201792 and at that
time had more than two billion active users.93 This represents a major
concentration of power and control over a significant amount of
speech.
Second, it is reasonable to conclude that many of the executives
and employees responsible for regulating content on these platforms
are politically liberal.94 A recent Stanford study reported in the New
York Times found that young Silicon Valley technology
entrepreneurs are within the range of the most left-leaning
Democrats. 95 This liberalism is reflected in the values and policies
that govern these companies and this was illustrated in the recent
firing of the Google engineer James Damore.96 Google fired Damore
because they had concluded he promoted harmful gender stereotypes
when he authored a paper that criticized what he believed to be
“Google’s ideological echo chamber.”97

91. Libby Watson, YouTube’s Restricted Mode is Hiding Some LGBT Content
[Update], GIZMODO (Mar. 17, 2017, 4:32 PM), https://gizmodo.com/youtubesrestricted-mode-is-hiding-some-lgbt-content-1793382337 [https://perma.cc/N3CELWJ4].
92. Matt Egan, Facebook and Amazon Hit $500 Billion Milestone, CNN MONEY
(July 27, 2017, 10:29 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/07/27/investing/facebookamazon-500-billion-bezos-zuckerberg/index.html [https://perma.cc/LAS6-9P5A].
93. Id.
94. Dylan Matthews, The Vast Majority of Tech Entrepreneurs are Democrats But a Different Kind of Democrat, VOX (Sept. 6, 2017, 1:20 PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/9/6/16260326/tech-entrepreneurssurvey-politics-liberal-regulation-unions [https://perma.cc/8K7W-FJBS].
95. Farhad Manjoo, Silicon Valley’s Politics: Liberal, With One Big Exception,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
6,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/technology/silicon-valley-politics.html
[https://perma.cc/KD2D-8LVL].
96. See Alain Sherter, James Damore Lawsuit: Fired Engineer Sues Google, CBS
NEWS (Jan. 8, 2018, 2:50 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/james-damorelawsuit-fired-engineer-sues-google/ [https://perma.cc/97EA-VYC7].
97. See id.
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Third, because these platforms are private, their actions are
generally outside the scope of the constitutional protection. 98
Concerns surrounding this censorship are warranted because this is
posed to continue or increase absent any preventive action by the
companies or the law. To be sure, the increasing attention being paid
to such censorship can in part be described by “The Streisand
Effect.”99 Nonetheless, the allegations of censorship warrant serious
consideration, and the next section will discuss whether social media
companies can be considered state actors and thus be subject to the
First Amendment’s protections.
While there are numerous social media platforms an influencer
can utilize, the photo-sharing website Instagram is by far the most
utilized.100 A report from a platform that connects companies with
influencers found that 99.3 percent of respondent influencers used
Instagram to share their messages, as compared to Facebook (67.1
percent), Snapchat (50.8 percent), and Twitter (43.1 percent).101
Instagram allows users to edit and share photographs and videos
(also known as “content”).102 When a user adds content it is displayed
on a user’s profile and other Instagram users who “follow” them are
able to see the content.103 The main goal is “to share and find only the
best photos and videos.”104 Each Instagram profile has a “followers”
and “following” count which allows Instagram users to know who
they follow, and how many users follow them.105 A profile may be set
to “public,” where all Instagram users may see the content, or to
98. Brown, supra note 20, at 563.
99. See Charles Arthur, The Streisand Effect: Secrecy in the Digital Age, THE
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
19,
2009,
8:05
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/mar/20/streisand-effect-internetlaw [https://perma.cc/TK3P-8KC4] (describing the Streisand Effect as a situation
where a person attempts to suppress or hide information, and as result, the opposite
occurs: more attention is drawn to that information).
100. Ayaz Nanji, The Most Important Social Media Networks for Influencers,
MARKETING
PROF.
(May
16,
2017),
https://www.marketingprofs.com/charts/2017/32069/the-most-important-socialnetwork-for-influencers [https://perma.cc/QAT8-2K56].
101. Id.
102. See Elise Moreau, What is Instagram, Anyway?, LIFEWIRE (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-instagram-3486316
[https://perma.cc/66LQGUN9].
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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“private”, where only an Instagram user’s followers can see the
content.106
Instagram also has an “explore” tab which allows users to find or
add followers and to search for interesting accounts to follow. 107
Instagram tailors the recommend content it provides to each
individual user. 108 Instagram users can also use the search bar to
search for specific users or hashtags.109 Hashtags are “words or multiword phrases preceded by the # symbol . . . .”110 If an Instagram post
includes hashtags on a public post, then the post will appear on the
hashtag page.111
III. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A. Principles, History, and Purpose
Any alleged constitutional violation begins with the threshold
question of whether the alleged violator’s conduct can be subject to
the Constitution’s protections. 112 This is because the United States
Constitution only applies to the actions or omissions of state actors,
and it does not constrain the behavior of private actors. 113 This
distinction between public and private action is known as the state
action doctrine.114 Much has been said about the doctrine’s confusing
and unpredictable nature. 115 Some have described it as
“dysfunctional” and “a conceptual disaster area”; Justice Black
described the United States Supreme Court’s state action
jurisprudence as “a torchless search for a way out of a damp and

106. Id.
107. Moreau, supra note 102.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Sandra Grauschopf, What Does ‘Hashtag’ Mean & How Do You Use One
Correctly?,
THE
BALANCE
EVERYDAY
(Sept.
30,
2017),
https://www.thebalance.com/what-does-hashtag-mean-and-how-do-you-use-one892814 [https://perma.cc/87M9-AC9G].
111. How Do I Use Hashtags?, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/3514606
21611097 [https://perma.cc/42X3-MBZT].
112. See Brown, supra note 20, at 563.
113. John L. Watts, Tyranny by Proxy: State Action and the Private Use of Deadly
Force, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237, 1239 (2014).
114. See Brown, supra note 20, at 561.
115. Id. at 562.
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echoing cave.” 116 On the other hand, some authorities have
commented that the doctrine is “the most important problem in
American law.”117 A key point of emphasis regarding this doctrine is
that although certain conduct that involves “constitutional values”118
might be restricted by private actors, there is no constitutional
violation because courts have no power to redress these private
interferences.119 In case after case, courts have consistently tolerated
the violation of essentially every value inherent in the constitution on
the basis that such private infringements 120 are bereft of state
action. 121 These private infringements are not at all insignificant
because they can produce the same or additional harm as state
actors.122 In fact, the increasing flow of wealth and power into the
hands of private actors increases these concerns because private action
can be essentially indistinguishable from state action, but only the
latter is subject to constitutional scrutiny.123
An often neglected inquiry is why the law should tolerate such
private infringements simply because they are committed by private
actors. 124 An important starting point to address this question is to
investigate the beliefs held at the time the Constitution was written.125
When the Constitution was written, there was widespread belief that
the common law adequately shielded personal liberties from private
invasion.126 The reasoning followed that there was no need for the
Constitution to address what was already given strong protections in
the common law. 127 However, when our national government was
116. See Brown, supra note 20, at 562.
117. Kevin L. Cole, Federal and State "State Action"': The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 327 n.3 (1990).
118. Id. at n.2 (defining constitutional values as “the value[s] that a particular
constitutional provision would promote if the provision were construed as applying
to both public and private deprivations”).
119. See id.
120. Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 507
(1985) (defining private infringements of constitutional rights as a short-hand for
actions by private individuals that seem to deny the values that courts protect when
they apply the constitution).
121. Id. at 510 (collecting cases).
122. Id. at 511.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Chemerinsky, supra note 120, at 511.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 512.
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created, a primary fear was that it wouldn’t be constrained by the
common law and that it could violate liberties in ways that private
entities couldn’t. 128 Therefore, the Bill of Rights was added to
incorporate these preexisting common law protections and require the
new national government to be constrained by them.129
When Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, it was still thought that
the common law provided adequate protection against private
infringements of rights such as discrimination by restaurants and
transportation.130 This was the basis of the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in the Civil Rights Cases which held that certain forms of private
discrimination were not controlled by the Constitution because people
could seek relief in the common law.131 This is a key point: the case
that formally announced the state action doctrine assumed that there
were effective common law protections when it reached its decision
finding no state action. 132 Now, however, there are increasingly no
common law protections for many rights, including private
infringements of speech. 133 This would include any such private
speech infringements committed by social media companies. So why
should such private infringements be accepted? Maybe they shouldn’t
be, and regardless of the answer, it is a question worth reconsidering
given the importance of free expression. Given the increasing power
of social media companies and the movement of speech online,
censorship allegations on social media platforms provide a wonderful
opportunity to once again reexamine the state action doctrine as Dean
Chemerinsky suggested in 1985.134

128. Id.
129. Id. at 513–14 (“For example, the fourth amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures was identical to the protection that the commonlaw actions of trespass and false arrest provided against private invasions of liberty.
Similarly, the fifth amendment's prohibition against government takings of property
without just compensation applied common-law principles of conversion to federal
actions. Basic common-law assurances redressing deprivations of life, liberty, and
property were applied to the national government via the fifth amendment's due
process clause. Most dramatically, legal historian Leonard Levy has demonstrated
that the first amendment's protection of freedom of speech was meant solely to
incorporate well-established common-law principles.”).
130. Id. at 515.
131. Chemerinsky, supra note 120, at 515.
132. Id. at 516–17 (emphasis added).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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B. State Action Exceptions
Setting aside the important history of the doctrine above, there are
exceptions to the general rule requiring state action, and the Supreme
Court has handed down several tests to determine when state action is
present. 135 There are two primary exceptions to the general rule
discussed above: the public function exception and the entwinement
exception.136
1. Public Function Exception
The “public function” exception provides that a private entity will
be deemed a state actor if they engage in conduct that is “traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State.” 137 The primary purpose of this
exception is to prevent private actors such as corporations and
companies from abusing their power when they have duties and
powers delegated to them by state actors. 138 The public function
exception has its origins in Marsh v. Alabama.139 There, a Jehovah’s
Witness entered a privately-owned town and distributed religious
information. 140 The managers of the town initiated criminal
proceedings against him, which led to a trespass conviction. 141 The
Supreme Court reversed and held that the private company town’s
property rights did not “justify the State's permitting a corporation to
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental
liberties . . . ” and treated the company owned town as a state actor.142
The Court based its decision on several rationales. 143 First, the
Court reasoned that the town was essentially identical to other towns
except for the fact that it was privately owned and could undermine
liberty in the same way that the government could.144 Second, because
the town and its shopping area were freely accessible to the public,
135. See Brown, supra note 20, at 564–65.
136. Jackson, supra note 90, at 140 (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (citation omitted)).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)).
140. Id.
141. Jackson, supra note 90, at 140.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 144.
144. Id.
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the town served a public function that was virtually identical to that
exercised by the state.145 Third, by treating the company town as a
state actor and subjecting constitutional scrutiny to its actions, the
value of democratic self-governance would be advanced.146 Each one
of these rationales supports a finding that social network platforms
should fall under the public function exception. 147 First, social
network platforms can inflict much greater injury to free speech than
the town in Marsh. 148 Second, these platforms are increasingly
becoming the primary tool by which people engage in the marketplace
of ideas, and they are also increasingly used by public officials to
communicate with members of the public. 149 Third, these social
networking websites are becoming important means for political
communication and mobilization.150
Despite the seemingly expansive scope of the language in Marsh,
the scope of Marsh has been considerably narrowed in later cases.151
In Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., the Court held that the public
function exception only “encompasses public functions that are both
‘traditionally and exclusively’ provided for by the State.” 152
Therefore, this case stands for the proposition that it is not enough for
a government to have historically engaged in a particular function;
privately run organizations must not also engage in the same activity
in order for state action to be found.153 It has also been argued that
social networking companies should still be viewed as state actors
because they are like “public squares and meeting places,” and they
are arguably the “town squares of the twenty-first century.” 154
Because managing public squares and meeting places have been
traditionally managed by the state, social networking websites can be
considered a public function that was traditionally within the purview
of the state.155

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Jackson, supra note 90, at 144.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jackson, supra note 90, at 145.
Id.
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974) (emphasis added).
Jackson, supra note 90, at 145.
Id.
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Thus far, with respect to private internet companies, courts have
not been receptive to the argument that they constitute state actors
under the public function exception. 156 The Third Circuit and two
additional federal courts have rejected157 the argument that America
Online (“AOL”) is a state actor because AOL “exercises absolutely
no powers which are in any way the prerogative, let alone the
exclusive prerogative, of the State,” and AOL is “merely one of many
private online companies which allow [their] members access to the
Internet . . . .”158 Further, other federal district courts have rejected
arguments that Sony’s PlayStation 3 Network is a state actor because
it “serves solely as a forum for people to interact subject to specific
contractual terms,” and the network functions mainly for
entertainment reasons.159 Courts have also rejected the notion that a
private domain name registrant is a state actor because the internet, as
well as the registration of domain names on the internet do not come
close to being “traditional and exclusive public functions.”160
Recently, a federal court, for the first time, thoroughly analyzed
whether a social media company is a state actor under the public
function exception.161 While the court dismissed the complaint with
leave to amend, it provides a model for how many courts are likely to
analyze claims that social media companies are state actors under
Marsh.
a. Prager University v. Google LLC
In Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, Plaintiff Prager University filed a
complaint asserting that YouTube violated their First Amendment
rights.162 Their principal argument was that while YouTube held itself
156. Id. at 142.
157. Id. at n.104 (citing Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003);
Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 546 (E.D. Va. 2003) (citing
Green, 318 F.3d at 472); see also Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948
F. Supp. 436, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
158. Id. at 143 (quoting Cyber Promotions, 948 F. Supp. at 437).
159. Jackson, supra note 90, at 143 (quoting Estavillo v. Sony Computer Entm't
Am., No. C-09-03007 RMW, 2009 WL 3072887 at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2009).
160. Id. n.107 (quoting Island Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 119 F.
Supp. 2d 289, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)).
161. Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-06064-LHK, 2018 WL 1471939,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018)
162. See id.
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out as a purveyor of viewpoint neutrality, it repeatedly engaged in
censorship practices that discriminated against Plaintiff because of its
conservative political views.163 They argued that the censorship took
the form of placing age restrictions on some of its videos or
“demonetizing” them, which means to prevent placing ads on their
videos in a viewpoint discriminatory manner. 164 Importantly, the
censorship allegations above did not include any claims that its videos
have been completely removed from YouTube. 165 To support its
arguments, they placed their videos side-by-side to videos where
access had been restricted next to other videos that had not been
restricted, which discussed the same or similar topic but from a liberal
point of view.166
Prager University’s key contention was based on an analogy to
Marsh. 167 They argued that YouTube holds itself out “as a public
forum dedicated to freedom of expression to all” and that “a private
property owner who operates its property as a public forum for speech
is subject to judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment.” 168 The
Court rejected this contention, but it also presented language from
Marsh that appeared supportive of the Plaintiff’s position: “[t]he more
an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”169
But, according to the Court, subsequent Supreme Court decisions
have rejected any broad extension of this language in Marsh. As
support for this proposition, the Court discussed what are referred to
as the “shopping mall cases.” 170 The Court began its discussion of
these cases, noting that in Logan Valley, the Supreme Court held that
a privately-owned shopping center was unable to forbid workers from
protesting a store in a shopping center because such a restriction

163. Id.
164. Id. at *2.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. Id.
167. Id. at *6.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170 .
See generally Brady C. Williamson & James A. Friedman, State
Constitutions: The Shopping Mall Cases, WIS. L. REV. 883 (1998).
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violated their First Amendment rights. 171 The Supreme Court in
Logan Valley reasoned that the shopping center was open to the public
in the same way that a commercial center of a town would be, and the
Supreme Court analogized to Marsh.172 It continued to reason that the
shopping center was “clearly the functional equivalent of the business
district of [the privately-owned town] involved in Marsh.”173
However, the Prager University Court pointed out over the course
of eight years, the Supreme Court formally overturned its decision in
Logan Valley and adopted the reasoning of Justice Black’s dissent in
Logan Valley.174 Justice Black authored the Marsh majority opinion,
and in his dissent in Logan Valley, he heavily criticized the Logan
Valley majority for its misunderstanding of Marsh and its appropriate
scope. Four years after Logan Valley, the Supreme Court in Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner held that a private shopping center was within its right
to forbid anti-Vietnam War protestors from disseminating literature in
the shopping center because it was not a state actor.175 The Supreme
Court held that, based on Justice Black’s dissent in Logan Valley,
Marsh “‘was never intended to apply’” outside “‘the very special
situation of a company-owned town.’”176 The Court emphasized that
in Marsh, the privately-owned town assumed the “full spectrum” of
powers that would traditionally be performed by the State. 177 The
Court then distinguished the shopping center at issue in the case
reasoning that there was “no comparable assumption or exercise of
municipal functions or power.”178
The Prager University Court summarized what it believed was the
key takeaway from the above cases: that the reach of Marsh is
limited.179 Consistent with that characterization, the Court rejected the
notion that Marsh supports YouTube being deemed a state actor
because of the simple fact that they operate a private forum for
171. Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939 at *6 (citing Amalgamated Food Emp.
Union Loc. 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968), abrogated
by Hudgens v. N. L. R. B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976)).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *7.
175. Id. (citing Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)).
176. Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939 at *7 (quoting Lloyd Corp., Ltd., 407 U.S.
at 562–63).
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting Lloyd Corp., Ltd., 407 U.S. at 569).
179. Id. at *8.

Spring 2019]

Patty

121

expression of varied perspectives. 180 Finally, the Prager University
Court recognized that while the Supreme Court, in Packingham,
recognized the increasing importance of social media, it was
distinguishable because the question of state action was not before the
Court.181
In conclusion, the Prager University Court reasoned that
YouTube appears to not at all be like a private corporation “that
governs and operates all municipal functions for an entire town, or
one that has been given control over a previously public sidewalk or
park, or one that has effectively been delegated the task of holding and
administering public elections.”182 YouTube and Google, according
to the Court, are private entities that maintain their own video-sharing
social media platform, and they are within their right as to how they
manage content that has been created or uploaded, 183 and that this
conclusion is consistent with other court decisions that have not
treated social media companies or online service providers as state
actors.184
Courts will likely find the reasoning in the Prager University case
persuasive given the way Marsh has been narrowed by the Supreme
Court. Thus, despite the increasing importance of social media
platforms in our discourse, courts will likely not be persuaded by
arguments that social media platforms should be deemed state actors
under the public function exception. But recent events, scholarship,
and statements from social media executives and lawmakers indicate
that the likelihood of state action may be greater under the
entwinement exception discussed below.
2. The Entwinement Exception
The second primary exception to the state action doctrine is the
entwinement exception. 185 Under the entwinement exception, a
private actor may be subject to constitutional scrutiny “because he has
acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials,

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939 at *8.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. (collecting cases).
Id. (collecting cases).
Jackson, supra note 23, at 152.

122

MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC.

[40

or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.”186 The
key requirement is that there is a “sufficiently close nexus” between
the government and the challenged action,187 because the purpose of
the exception is to assure the protections of the constitution are only
triggered when it can be said that the government is responsible for
the particular conduct the plaintiff is challenging. 188 Therefore,
“private conduct must comply with the Constitution if the government
has authorized, encouraged, or facilitated the unconstitutional
conduct.” 189 For example, state action will be found under this
exception if a private party was given the power to manage publicly
accessible property knowing that the private party will prevent access
to the property in a manner that violates the constitution. 190
Importantly, mere government licensing or regulation is not enough
to establish state action. The same is true for government financial
support of a nongovernmental party, unless the financial support is
given to weaken constitutional protections.191
Some scholars have argued that because the federal government
was involved in the internet’s creation, and its goal for this was to
facilitate communication and the exchange of ideas, the federal
government should be seen as adequately entwined with the internet
to support the treatment of internet actors as state actors.192 But this
argument has been criticized by those who support considering social
media platforms as state actors; they contend it would foreclose a
finding of state action because the government did not participate in
the creation of social media companies. 193 In addition, it has been
argued that the approach above would not strike an appropriate
balance because it would effectively treat all internet actors as state
actors. 194 Regardless, courts to this point have rejected these
arguments.195

186. Id. at n.160 (quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
187. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
188. Id.
189 . Jackson, supra note 23, at 152 n.161 (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519–21 (4th ed. 2011)).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 153.
194. Jackson, supra note 23, at 153.
195. Id. at n.167.
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Courts have also rejected other arguments that social media
platforms or their parent companies have sufficient relations with the
government to become sufficiently entwined.196 Federal courts have
rejected the contention that Facebook is a state actor because of its
contractual relationship with the government, which allows agencies
to operate certain pages on Facebook. 197 Courts have similarly
rejected the argument that Google is sufficiently entwined with the
government because Google has collaborated with the government to
create a digital library with state universities. 198 Benjamin Jackson
argues that similar contentions are likely to continue to be
unsuccessful given the minimal contacts between the government and
social media companies, and that to date, the websites do not seem to
have any special relationship with the government warranting a
finding of state action.199
However, Jackson recognizes that his contention is currently
limited to the situation in the United States.200 He presents numerous
examples of foreign governments being more actively engaged in
censorship activity by requesting Facebook, for example, to take
down certain videos or posts.201 Jackson correctly emphasizes the fact
specific nature of the state action inquiry, and how litigants could
possibly be successful on an entwinement claim if the right facts
presented themselves. 202 One scenario he presents is if Facebook
began censoring content related to WikiLeaks in coordination with
federal agencies.203 He presents another where entwinement could be
found if the government and social media platforms engage in a joint
initiative to protect children from sexual predators.204 Recent trends
in the United States illustrate that Jackson’s positions could be
vindicated, and regarding his sexual predator hypothetical, he may
have a crystal ball.
Recent events indicate that the U.S. government may elect to take
a more active role in working with social media companies to censor
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Jackson, supra note 23, at n.167.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jackson, supra note 23, at n.167.
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content.205 As one example, the U.S. has become more concerned with
the deleterious effect of unrestrained communication on social media
platforms, as illustrated by the increasing concerns surrounding “fake
news” and the U.S. government’s desire to limit its effect on our
elections.206 When members of Congress held hearings related to the
dissemination of fake news, multiple members expressed their grave
concerns related to fake news. 207 Some Democrats explicitly
threatened to attempt to regulate social media companies if they fail
to address the different manifestations of fake news. 208 Dianne
Feinstein, in one hearing with social media executives, remarked,
“[y]ou have to be the ones to do something about it . . . [o]r we will.”209
Additional support for the proposition that entwinement may be more
likely is that recently, some experts have commented that social media
companies may not be able to tackle the fake news problem on their
own even if they wanted to.210 This is because they lack the “expertise
or intelligence or the assets” in their companies211, and it is extremely
difficult to draw the line between fake news and garden variety
political punditry. 212 Former executives within Facebook have also
suggested that social media companies ought to do more to solve the
fake news problem. 213 Adam D’Angelo, a former chief technology
officer at Facebook, commented that it is essential that users are more
205 . Kara Swisher, US Government Should Deal With Fake News Conflict,
CNBC (Mar. 9, 2018, 7:43 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2018/03/09/usgovernment-should-deal-with-fake-news-conflict-kara-swisher.html
[https://perma.cc/KS7P-CWKV] (presenting the comments of Ash Carter, the
former Defense Secretary, specifically advocating that tech companies work
together with the government to reach solutions to fight fake news).
206. Darrel M. West, Report: How to Combat Fake News and Disinformation,
BROOKINGS (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-combatfake-news-and-disinformation [https://perma.cc/H2Y8-TSKY].
207. Zach Weissmueller, ‘Fake News’ Is Not an Excuse to Regulate the Internet,
REASON (Jan. 17, 2018), https://reason.com/archives/2018/01/17/why-fake-newsis-not-an-excuse-to-regula [https://perma.cc/455R-Q3E6].
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Ali Breland, Social Media Fights Back Against Fake News, THE HILL (May
27, 2017, 11:52 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/335370-social-mediaplatforms-take-steps-to-protect-users-from-fake-news/
[https://perma.cc/X6AEG78N].
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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aware of where their news is really coming from, and government
regulation at some point to address this issue is a “real option.”214
Therefore, while concrete examples of entwinement between
social media companies and the government are lacking in the United
States, it appears that the probability of such a situation is increasing
as lawmakers, experts, and members of social media companies
become more concerned about content on social media. 215 The
government could begin to affirmatively work with these companies
to censor content and create the entwinement necessary to trigger the
protections of the First Amendment.216
Interestingly, a case almost exactly matching Benjamin Jackson’s
sexual predator hypothetical above came before the Supreme Court in
2017 in Packingham v. North Carolina.217 There, the state action issue
was not before the Court; the case involved a North Carolina law that
prohibited sex offenders from accessing social media platforms. 218
The Court struck the law down and held that it violated the First
Amendment.219 In that case, there were no facts illustrating that the
government cooperated with Facebook to enforce the particular law
against Petitioner. The Petitioner who challenged his conviction under
that statute was discovered by a law enforcement officer looking for
violators on his own.220 But in the future, as Jackson points out, one
could reasonably anticipate that a situation could occur where the
enforcement of a similar law would require Facebook sharing
information of potential violators with authorities. 221 Due to the
highly fact-specific nature of the state action doctrine and its
exceptions, a finding of state action through the entwinement
exception is clearly an uphill battle, but it is one that appears to be
increasingly likely.222
214. Matthew Ingram, Former Facebook Exec Says Government Action on Fake
News
Is
a
Real
Possibility,
FORTUNE
(Apr.
25,
2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/04/25/facebook-government-fake-news/
[https://perma.cc/KXD6-B4VR].
215. See Jackson, supra note 23, at 154.
216. See id.
217. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730,
1734 (2017) (No. 15–1194).
221. See Jackson, supra note 23, at 154.
222. See Chemerinsky, supra note 120, at 511.
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But concluding that social media companies are not state actors is
another example of how the doctrine tolerates significant private
infringements to go unchecked.223 In addition, the doctrine developed
based on the premise that infringements by private actors were
adequately protected by the common law.224 But as more individual
rights were created, many were left unprotected,225 and the same is
true with respect to social media companies; no such protections exist
for claims of censorship by social media companies in the common
law. Such a reality should give us pause to consider the utility of the
state action doctrine along with how we can effectively promote
freedom of expression on social media platforms.
To be sure, there are some strong reasons why treating social
media companies as state actors would be problematic. 226 While
social media platforms play an increasingly influential and important
role in our national conversation, one could argue that degree of
influence should not be the test for state action.227 If this were the test,
every employer would be a state actor, and possibly every family,
which may allow the exceptions to swallow the rule.228 Treating these
companies as state actors would also hamstring their ability to respond
to many other problems such as “trolling, flooding, [and] abuse . . .
.”229
But without legal recourse under the First Amendment, there is no
guarantee that individual instances or patterns of censorship will be
adequately addressed. Disputes will be resolved under the contractual
relationships established by social media companies who are free to
limit (or extend) the scope of expression in comparison to the First
Amendment or discriminate based on viewpoint. 230 This is
particularly troubling if such claims of censorship continue or
increase, especially if the claims involve viewpoint discrimination,
and it warrants an important conversation about how to ensure private
companies commit to free expression on their platforms.
Thus, while unlikely, it is possible that a court could find that a
social media company is a state actor and disagree with the reasoning
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See id.
Id. at 511–12.
See id. at 511–16.
See Wu, supra note 13.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See Fradette, supra note 3, at 948.
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in Prager University, for example, or find state action under the
entwinement exception. The next section will address the appropriate
level of First Amendment scrutiny a court should apply if they were
to consider social media companies state actors.
C. The First Amendment
The free speech clause of the First Amendment provides that
Congress “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”231
The history of the First Amendment is as interesting as it is
surprising. 232 For most of American history, the First Amendment
remained dormant, even well into the 1920s.233 It finally came to life
when the government began controlling speech during the First World
War by levying criminal charges on those who were opposed to the
war.234 Initially, federal courts and the Supreme Court were silent in
response to this strong censorship.235 This trend changed only after
Judge Hand and others began articulating the foundation for the
modern First Amendment. 236 First Amendment jurisprudence has
been characterized as “sprawling”237 and highly fact-specific.238 This
characterization has raised concerns that judicial activism is being
promoted, and that there is a lack of guidance for lower courts and
practitioners.239

231. U.S. CONST. amend I.
232. See Wu, supra note 13.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at n.17 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
237. Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the Inescapable
Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (2011).
238. The fact-specific nature has been stated both as a general observation and as
a criticism of the doctrine. Compare The Honorable John Paul Stevens, The
Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1300 (1993) (presenting the fact-specific
nature of first amendment jurisprudence neutrally), with Mike Rappaport, Justice
Thomas on the Tiers of Scrutiny, LAW & LIBERTY (Aug. 12, 2016),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/2016/08/12/justice-thomas-on-the-tiers-of-scrutiny
[https://perma.cc/CU5S-WH7T] (presenting Justice Thomas’s views that factspecific nature is better characterized as inconsistency that is undesirable).
239. Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial
Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 299 (1998).

128

MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC.

[40

1. The First Amendment: Tiers of Scrutiny
First Amendment free speech doctrine is incredibly formalistic.240
It “aggressively subdivides the known world into endless categories
and describes distinctive rules and tests to evaluate the
constitutionality of regulations that fall within those categories.”241
Under a First Amendment speech analysis, the first step is to place
the speech regulation into its proper category.242 There are two main
categories: content-neutral laws and content-based laws. 243
Distinguishing between these two categories is no easy task, and how
the speech regulation is characterized is frequently outcomedeterminative.244 After a speech regulation is categorized, it will be
subject to the standard of scrutiny that has been determined for that
particular category.245 There are three different levels of scrutiny that
can apply to a particular speech regulation: “rational basis review,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.”246
Rational basis review is the lowest standard of review; it is highly
deferential, and the default standard that courts apply. 247 This review
carries a presumption that the law is constitutional.248 It demands that
the challenged regulation be “rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.”249 Given this highly deferential standard, this
level of scrutiny provides almost no problem for regulations that
impinge on speech.250
240. See Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV.
1981, 1982 (2016).
241. Id.
242. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, §
3:1 (2018).
243. Erika Schutzman, We Need Professional Help: Advocating for A Consistent
Standard of Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate the First
Amendment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2019, 2028 (2015).
244 .
See SMOLLA, supra note 242, at § 3.1; Erwin Chemerinsky, Content
Neutrality As A Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme
Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 53–54 (2000).
245. Schutzman, supra note 243, at 2026.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. David T. Hardy, The Right to Arms and Standards of Review: A Tale of
Three Circuits, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (2014).
249. Schutzman, supra note 243, at 2026 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Cir., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).
250. See Schutzman, supra note 243, at 2026.
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Intermediate scrutiny is the second most stringent form of review;
it requires that a “regulation directly advance[] a substantial
government interest and that the regulation is not more extensive than
necessary to serve that interest.”251 Courts apply this level of scrutiny
to content-neutral regulations as well as several other types of
regulations. 252 This level of review is one of the Supreme Court’s
most commonly utilized balancing methods.253 Unlike rational basis
review, which arguably acts as a rubber stamp for regulations that
burden speech, and strict scrutiny, which often is deadly rather than
strict,254 intermediate scrutiny demands that a court compare opposing
interests and is not nearly as outcome-determinative.255 Given that at
its core it is a balancing test, it has received significant criticism from
judges and scholars who charge that it is both unpredictable and that
it incentivizes judicial activism.256 It has also been characterized as
“malleable, uncertain, highly flexible, unpredictable, contrived,
inconsistent, and inadequate.”257 The test has also been manipulated
by the Supreme Court.258 In several cases, the Court has applied the
test to regulations that are normally subject to strict scrutiny, or altered
the application of the intermediate scrutiny standard to effectively
require a justification that is between intermediate and strict
scrutiny.259 As a result, dissenting justices have criticized this scrutiny
as a violation of stare decisis.260
Strict scrutiny offers the utmost protection to speech under the
First Amendment. 261 Under this standard of review, courts uphold

251. See id. at 2026–27.
252. See id. at 2027; Wexler, supra note 239, at 301, n.15 (listing the different
applications of intermediate scrutiny).
253. Wexler, supra note 239, at 300.
254. Id. at n.16 (quoting Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on A Changing Court: A Model for A Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793,
812 (2006) (providing an empirical analysis to disprove the widespread assertion
that when strict scrutiny applies, laws are almost always struck down).
255. Wexler, supra note 239, at 300.
256. Id. at 300–01.
257. Id. at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 301–02.
260. Wexler, supra note 239, at 303.
261. Schutzman, supra note 243, at 2027.
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regulations only if they “further[] a compelling interest and [are]
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”262
2. Speech Regulated Under Content-Neutral Laws
There are two major categories that speech is placed into, and each
has its own level of scrutiny.263 Content-neutral laws, as their label
suggests, apply to speech regardless of the particular subject matter or
content conveyed; they “regulate the time, place, or manner of
expression.” 264 These regulations are subject to a less demanding
review, and as a consequence, they are upheld more frequently. 265
Content-neutral laws are commonly perceived as less threatening to
free expression given that they don’t target specific content; however,
many courts have taken a contrary view, recognizing that contentneutral laws can actually burden more speech than certain content
based laws.266 If a speech regulation is deemed content-neutral, it will
survive if it passes intermediate scrutiny.267
The first step in the content-neutrality inquiry is determining
whether the regulation is content-neutral on its face.268 If it is, then the
court should a consider whether the purpose behind enacting the law
is content-neutral or content-based. 269 Therefore, before concluding
that a law is content-neutral, a court must engage in a two-step inquiry:
first, evaluate the face of the regulation, and then its purpose.270
3. Speech Regulated Under Content-Based Laws
On the contrary, content-based regulations are presumed to be
unconstitutional and are subject to strict scrutiny.271 To survive strict
scrutiny, the government must prove that the law is “narrowly tailored
to serve compelling state interests.” 272 There are several means by
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. at 2027 (internal quotations omitted).
See SMOLLA, supra note 242, at § 3.1.
See id. § 3.2, n.5.
See id. § 3.1.
See id.
See id.; see also Schutzman, supra note 243, at 2027.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2226.
Id.
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which a speech regulation can be deemed content-based: (1) if the
speech is targeted “based on its communicative content”; (2) if the
regulation “applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed
or the idea or message expressed”; (3) if the regulation cannot be
supported “without reference to the content of the regulated speech”;
or (4) that were passed “because of disagreement with the message
conveyed.”273 Many scholars argue that the purpose of distinguishing
speech regulations based on whether they regulate content is to
prevent regulations that are motivated by animus towards certain
disfavored speech.274
In First Amendment jurisprudence, viewpoint discrimination is
viewed as a subset of content-based speech regulation.275 Generally,
the First Amendment forbids viewpoint discrimination; examples of
this type of regulation involve government restrictions based on
“disapproval of the ideas expressed,” 276 or favoring certain speech
over other speech.277 Viewpoint discrimination is also found when a
financial burden is imposed on particular speakers based on the
content of their speech.278
4. Intermediate Scrutiny: The Most Appropriate Tier
There are multiple ways a user could theoretically contest social
media speech regulations. For instance, a user could seek to challenge
specific restrictions placed on the content they post, or they could seek
to challenge the overall policies that govern content on the
platform.279 Looking at the Prager University case as an example, the
273. Id. at 2222 (internal quotations omitted).
274. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 240, at 1983 (citing Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 362 (1997);
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (arguing a main
purpose of First Amendment law is to discover and prevent improper government
motives)).
275. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995)
(reasoning that viewpoint discrimination is an egregious form of content
discrimination).
276. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
277. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828.
278. Id. at 828–29 (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991)).
279. Future articles could expand on other legal challenges which might require
the application of different tiers of scrutiny.
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Plaintiff did not advocate for a particular level of scrutiny to be
applied to the discriminatory practices of YouTube if the Court
deemed YouTube to be a state actor. But looking at Prager’s
allegations and those raised by other users, it appears the restrictions
placed on their videos are the result of a content-based speech
regulation regime. YouTube’s restricted mode feature makes certain
videos unavailable to users who have restricted mode turned on, and
those restrictions and categorizations are determined based on the
content of the speech at issue.280 Thus, at least with respect to these
allegations, and others like them, the regulation at issue would be
deemed facially content-based because they target speech and subject
it to restrictions based on its “communicative content.” 281 Further,
content-based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny, a principle
recently clarified and emphasized by the majority in Reed v. Town of
Gilbert.282
However, intermediate scrutiny appears to be the most appropriate
level of scrutiny to apply to social media speech regulations despite
the fact that they would likely be content based restrictions
traditionally subject to strict scrutiny. This is because, as private
companies who face pressures to censor content, a more deferential
approach should be given to their decisions to regulate content on their
platforms. 283 While this recommendation may contravene existing
Supreme Court precedent under Reed, there is increasing support for
the proposition that not every content-based speech restriction ought
to be subject to strict scrutiny.284
The concurrences in Reed advanced several arguments to support
the notion that rigidly applying strict scrutiny to content-based
restrictions does not always make sense.285 The reasoning from these
concurrences strongly supports applying intermediate scrutiny to the
content-based speech restrictions of social media companies.
280. See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at 4, Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) No. 17-CV-06064LHK, 2018 BL 105688 (discussing the content regulation regime).
281. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.
282. See id.
283. See Jackson, supra note 22, at 142.
284. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234 (Breyer, J. concurring); Nat'l Inst. of Family &
Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 834 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted in part
sub nom.; Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 464 (2017).
285. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234–36 (Breyer, J. concurring).
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In Reed, Justice Breyer’s concurrence opened by stating that the
First Amendment required sensitivity to both expressive interests and
the public’s legitimate need for sensible regulations.286 Content-based
restrictions and the resulting strict scrutiny, he reasoned, ought to be
“a rule of thumb” rather than automatic because strict scrutiny almost
certainly leads to a regulation being struck down, however reasonable
it is.287 He conceded that there are undoubtedly situations where it
makes perfect sense to apply strict scrutiny to a content-based
restriction; in several cases, the Supreme Court has discovered that
certain content-based restrictions were used to suppress disfavored
viewpoints. 288 He also affirmed the importance of preventing the
government form disfavoring a particular point of view because it
would inhibit the free exchange of ideas.289
But he also pointed out that such an automatic trigger of strict
scrutiny would hamstring the government’s ability to implement
sensible regulations because such regulations almost always require
content-based regulations.290 The essence of his opinion is that it is a
much better approach to limit the application of the content based
strict scrutiny framework to situations where there are instances of
viewpoint discrimination or a traditional public forum is threatened,
but in all other cases, the framework should be a “rule of thumb.”291
The key question Breyer focuses on is whether the challenged
regulation disproportionately harms First Amendment interests when
compared to the objectives of the regulation. 292 To answer this
question, he would consider “the seriousness of the harm to speech,
the importance of the countervailing objectives, the extent to which
the law will achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less
restrictive ways of doing so.” 293 Justice Kagan joined by Justice
Ginsburg echoed this point of view.294 Further, they also reasoned that
the two primary reasons to apply strict scrutiny to content-based

286.
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Id. at 2234.
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135 S. Ct. at 2235.
Id. at 2234.
Id. at 2234–35.
Id. at 2236.
See id. (Ginsburg, J., Kagan, J., concurring).
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regulations is to prevent viewpoint favoritism and preserve the
marketplace of ideas.295
Additionally, several circuits have expressed disfavor with rigidly
applying strict scrutiny to all content-based speech restrictions.296 One
such example is in cases where courts were faced with disputes about
the appropriate amount of protection that “professional speech” 297
ought to be afforded.298 The cases from these circuits stand for the
proposition that intermediate scrutiny applies to content-based
restrictions in the context of professional speech. Some support this
approach because it correctly balances the rights of professionals to
speak with a state’s right to regulate the profession to advance the
public interest.299
The reasoning expressed in the Reed concurrences, along the
rationales supporting the application of intermediate scrutiny to
professional speech, support applying intermediate scrutiny to the
speech regulations put in place by social media companies. Clearly,
private social media companies are very different entities than a
government. A fundamental aspect of a social media company’s
business model is advertising revenue from the videos uploaded by
users, and these companies have a strong interest in maintaining
relationships with those advertisers.300 In addition, they are arguably
entitled to additional deference because the initial decision to restrict
content is often performed by an algorithm due to the voluminous
amount of content that needs to be reviewed on a daily basis.301
What complicates this analysis, however, is the fact that the
allegations against YouTube and Facebook have centered around
viewpoint discrimination.302 For example, Prager University contends
295. Id.
296. See Schutzman, supra note 243, at 2042.
297 . Id. at 2033 (defining professional speech as “personalized” speech by
a professional that occurs “in the context of a fiduciary-type relationship” between
a professional and that professional's client).
298. Id. at 2042 (presenting decisions from the Eleventh, Third, and Fourth
Circuit that applied intermediate scrutiny to professional speech regulations).
299. Id. at 2053.
300. Wakabayashi & Maheshwari, supra note 70.
301. See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at 4, Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) No. 17-CV-06064LHK, 2018 BL 105688 (discussing the content regulation regime).
301. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226.
302. See Prager Univ., 2018 WL 1471939 at *2.

Spring 2019]

Patty

135

that the many of their videos are placed into restricted mode, but many
other videos created by liberal users are not placed into restrictive
mode.303 It is at this level that the rationales supporting the approaches
in the Reed concurrences break down. Those concurring justices
emphasized the prudence of flexibility when it comes to applying the
First Amendment, but they couched those positions in concessions
that strict scrutiny is especially appropriate when viewpoint
discrimination is afoot. 304 Therefore, a Court should consider the
flexibility that Justice Breyer advocated and depart from intermediate
scrutiny if it is established that regulations are applied or created to
discriminate based on viewpoint.305
Finally, the benefits of applying intermediate scrutiny to contentbased restrictions on social media outweigh the costs. Although this
tier of scrutiny has been criticized for its impact on stare decisis and
promoting judicial activism, it is, at its core, a balancing test.306 In the
context of social media platforms, it is essential to give due
consideration to the reasons why these companies would restrict
certain content. Intermediate scrutiny best strikes the appropriate
balance between the importance of speech and the need for social
media platforms to proactively manage content to further their
legitimate business interests.307
IV. CONCLUSION
Social media companies have transformed the way in which we
engage in the important conversations of our day.308 These companies
are both influential and powerful and have signaled their desire to
provide a platform for all ideas to be exchanged. But this ideal is not
always achieved in practice. Social media companies have many good
reasons to censor content which would not survive constitutional
scrutiny. But censorship on these platforms, especially censorship that
may involve political bias, should give us pause. This is especially
true if legal recourse is unavailable due to the low likelihood that these
companies will be deemed state actors. Regardless, this note has
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
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See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234–36 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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See Jackson, supra note 23, at 156.
Duggan & Smith, supra note 15.

136

MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC.

[40

argued that if the courts were to consider social media companies state
actors, they ought to apply intermediate scrutiny because it strikes the
best balance between expressive values and respect for the
sovereignty of social media companies.309 Some may argue that those
who allege censorship are free to join a different platform or create
one of their own, but such a contention should also give us pause
because of the likelihood that such a trend would further deepen the
polarized state of our discourse.310 It is time to once again to rethink
our state action jurisprudence, as Dean Chemerinsky argued, by
asking ourselves “why infringements of the most basic values—
speech, privacy, and equality—should be tolerated just because the
violator is a private entity rather than the government.”311
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